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Newspaper-Broadcast Combinations in the Same
Community: How Much Divestiture for the Sake of
Diversity?
When profit potential from broadcasting was minimal or
nonexistent, the Federal Communications Commission1 urged
newspaper owners to pioneer the development of the industry-first in radio, then in television. Although the FCC generally
favored diversity of ownership, there were few competent applicants for the airwaves, and newspapers provided strong journalisSince then the
tic traditions for the newly developing te~hnology.~
Commission's policy favoring diversified ownership has never
barred the granting or renewal of broadcast licenses to newspaper
owners in the same community if the overall public interest is
~erved.~
In 1944 the FCC first proposed a rule to restrict crossownership of newspapers and radio stations in the same community to promote diversity of ownership. The Commission, however, ultimately decided that because of the "grave legal and
policy questions involved," it would continue to resolve crossownership problems on a case-by-case basise4Ad hoc consideration continued until 1970, when because of the rapid development
and maturity that broadcasting had experienced, the FCC again
initiated rulemaking proceedings to consider whether one party
should be permitted to own or control both a broadcast station
. ~ these proand a daily newspaper in the same c ~ m m u n i t yFrom
ceedings and as part of an ongoing concern with concentrated
media contr01,~the Commission proposed a ban of all newspaper1. Hereinafter referred to as "Commission" or "FCC."
2. Amendment of Sections 73.35,73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Second
Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1074-75 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Second Report
and Order]; BROADCASTING,
Aug. 5, 1974, a t 23-26.
3. See text accompanying notes 57-64 infra.
4. Newspaper Ownership of Radio Station (Notice of Dismissal of Proceeding), 9 Fed.
Reg. 702, 703 (1944).
5. Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM,and Television Broadcast Stations, Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.2d 339 (1970). The proposed rule required
divestiture within five years and prohibited future acquisitions of broadcast outlets in
order to limit one party's holding in any market to one or more daily newspapers, one
television station, or one AM-FM combination. Id. a t 346.
6. The FCC first initiated rules to combat media concentration by prohibiting one
party from owning more than one FM radio station in the same area. This rule operated
prospectively only. Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, 5
Fed. Reg. 2382,2384 (1940).Later the FCC likewise prohibited future common ownership
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broadcast cross-ownership in a common city of operation. Over
200 formal comments and 25 major studies were filed in response.'
Following a five-year period of evidentiary consideration, the
FCC issued less restrictive rules8 preserving the overwhelming
majority of existing newspaper-broadcast combinations in the
same community (commonly referred to as "grandfathering"),Y
requiring divestiture within five years of combinations in communities served by only one daily newspaper and one broadcast
station,1° and prohibiting the future formation or transfer of ownership of any co-located newspaper-broadcast combination.ll
of two or more VHF-TV stations in the same community. Rules and Regulations Governing Commercial Television Broadcast Stations, 6 Fed. Reg. 2282, 2284-85 (1941). When
the FCC prohibited one party from owning or controlling two or more AM stations in the
same community, Multiple Ownership of Standard Broadcast Stations, 8 Fed. Reg. 16065
( E M ) , approximately 20 owners were required to divest when on a case-by-case basis their
ownerships were found to be anticompetitive. 11 FCC ANN.REP. 12 (1946).
In 1968 first notice was given of proposed rules limiting the common ownership of
different broadcast services within the same market, e.g., restricting one party's ownership
of a radio station and television station in the same community. Standard, FM and
Television Stations, Multiple Ownership, 33 Fed. Reg. 5315 (1968). The FCC ultimately
prohibited only prospectively the cross-ownership of VHF-TV and radio stations in the
same market and permitted AM-FM combinations. Amendment of Sections 73.35,73.240
and 73.636 of the Commission Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM,
and Television Broadcast Stations, First Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as First Report and Order].
See text accompanying notes 77-80 infra for restrictions on cable ownership.
7. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1090-94. The parties represented a
broad spectrum of interests including combination owners, other broadcasters, and public
interest groups.
8. Multiple Ownership, 47 C.F.R. $0 73.35, .240, .636 (1977).
9. Under the FCC's ruling, divestiture was ordered for 7 of 79 television-newspaper
combinations in the same community. Thus 72 television-newspaper cross-ownerships
were left intact. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938,946 n.18
(D.C. Cir.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978). Divestiture was ordered
for 16 of approximately 250 radio-newspaper combinations. Id. See [I9771 BROADCASTING
Y .B. A-45-49.
10. A station is considered to serve a community by encompassing the community
with a city-grade signal. A city-grade signal, the most intense under the FCC rules,
provides a clear signal to the entire community to which the station is licensed.
In order to understand the Commission's ruling, several other terms should be understood. "The word 'control' . . . is not limited to majority stock ownership, but includes
actual working control in whatever manner exercised." 47 C.F.R. 5 73.636 n.1 (1977).
"Community" or "market" is defined by wave reach. See note 11 infra. "[A] daily
newspaper is one which is published four or more days per week, which is in the English
language and which is circulated generally in the community of publication." 47 C.F.R.
$! 73.636 n.lO. Noncommercial television stations and college newspapers are not subject
to divestiture, and their presence in a community does not exempt co-located monopolies
from the rules. 47 C.F.R. $ 73.636(b) & n.lO.
11. No newspaper-broadcast combination can be transferred in whole except by inheritance. A daily newspaper cannot be issued a broadcast license in the same community;
if a broadcast licensee acquires a newspaper in the same city, it must divest itself of the
station within one year. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1074-76,1099-107.This
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Thus, in spite of its policy favoring diversity of media ownership,
the Commission required divestiture in only the "most egregious
cases." Breakup was not ordered in markets containing more
than one daily newspaper and broadcast station because the concern for potential disruption to public service from divestiture
outweighed the need for diversity in such markets.12 Had the
record before the FCC revealed evidence of misuse or harm arising from cross-ownership in communities other than those served
by only one daily newspaper and one broadcast station, the Commission may have required more divestiture.13
The National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, the Justice Department, the National Association of Broadcasters, the
American Newspaper Publishers Association, and other media
interests14 petitioned the D.C. Circuit challenging the FCC
provision prohibits the formation or transfer of a combination if the only television station
places a "grade A signal" over the city in which only one newspaper is published. A grade
A signal is one that transmits a good picture 90% of the time a t the best 70% of receiver
locations. Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 515 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1955). A
grade A signal is weaker than a city-grade signal. See Second Report and Order, supra
note 2, a t 1075; W. GORMLEY,
THEEFFECTS
OF NEWSPAPER-TELEVISION
CROSS-OWNERSHIP
ON
NEWSHOMOGENEITY
206 n.1 (1976). By defining a market in a particular way, the FCC
can constrict or expand the effect of its multiple ownership order. The number of stations
in a market increases if stations are defined by a grade A signal rather than by a citygrade signal. Thus, because the Commission's prohibition of future combinations defines
the market by a grade A signal, rather than by a city-grade signal as required by the
divestiture rules, fewer cities are likely to harbor media monopolies under the prospective
rules. Although the Commission had been urged to employ grade A signals in determining
the number of media outlets in a market for purposes of breaking up existing combinations, it chose to use the city standard because only a station encompassing a community
with a city-grade signal could provide an "additional voice" on local matters. Second
Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1082.
12. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, at 1080. ''[Yhe existence of a city grade
television station is sufficient to exempt a radio combination from divestiture, but the
existence of a city grade radio station does not exempt a television combination." National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 946 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd
in part and reo'd in part, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978). The difference is attributable to television's
more powerful impact. Id.
13. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1089. In addition, the Commission
decided against granting a hearing in renewal application situations involving petitions
to deny based on cross-ownership unless there is a showing of economic monopolization
that may warrant actions under the Sherman Act. Id. a t 1088. For a description of what
may be required under the Sherman Act, see note 169 infra. The FCC deferred decision
on the weight to be given the cross-ownership factor in license renewal hearings involving
competing applicants for the same licenses. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t
1088.
14. Two radio stations filed briefs-SJAB, Inc. and Owosso Broadcasting, Inc. Intervenor briefs included the Washington Post Co. and KSL, Inc. The Brockway Co., Gray
Communications Systems, Inc., and the Daily Telegraph Printing Co. also submitted
briefs for the court's consideration.
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rules.'Vome of the petitioners contended the Commission arbitrarily exceeded its authority by issuing the prospective ban and
limited breakup order without individual hearings.lWthers
argued that the FCC should have required across-the-board divestiture consistent with the "paramount public interest in diversification of media control."17 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Commission's prospective
ban on the formation and transfer of newspaper-broadcast combinations, but vacated the provision grandfathering existing combinations and instead required the Commission to adopt a rule
compelling divestiture in all cases of newspaper-broadcast crossownership in the same market, even if other independently owned
newspapers or broadcast stations existed in the area? The court's
decision gave "diversity of media ownership controlling weight,"
even though abuses from common ownership were not established.lg
The Supreme Court of the United States in FCC v. National
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB)20consolidated six
petitions2' appealing the D.C. Circuit's decision on various
grounds. Essentially sustaining the FCC's limited divestiture
15. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
aff'd in part and reu'd i n part, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978). An appeal from an FCC rule may be
taken to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
5 402(b) (1970).
16. E.g.,Brief for Petitioner American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n a t 53, National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and
rev'd i n part, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978).
17. E.g.,Brief for Petitioner National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting a t 70, National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd in
part and rev 'd in part, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978).
18. 555 F.2d a t 966 & n.112. Although the court of appeals did not affirm the Commission's order, the Commission's waiver requirements were approved. Temporary or permanent waivers from the ban would be granted after a hearing showing that the rules'
purposes would be better served by continuation of the combination, or that sale of half
of the combination would be impossible or possible only a t an artificially depressed price.
Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1085.
19. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 967, 969 (D.C. Cir.
1977). This statement was made by the court in response to an FCC motion for stay of
mandate. The Commission sought the stay in order to allow the Supreme Court to consider the Commission's petition for a writ of certiorari. The court stayed its order requiring
the FCC to mandate divestiture of all co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations, but
did not stay the Commission's prospective ban. Id. a t 970.
20. 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978).
21. The six actions consolidated for review were FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, Channel Two Television Co. v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting,
National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, Illinois Broadcasting Co. v. National Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting, and Post Co. v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting.

6751

MEDIA DIVERSITY AND DIVESTITURE

679

order and prospective ban of co-located cross-ownership,22the
Court found the D.C. Circuit had improperly elevated the significance of ownership diversity above other public interest factors.
This Comment will detail the Supreme Court's discussion of
diversity of ownership and other public interest factors impacting
on proper regulation of cross-owned newspaper and broadcast
media. After examining the relative importance of various competing policies, a balance will be recommended from which crossownership can be most effectively regulated in contemplation of
the overall public interest.

A. FCC Regulation--The Public Interest Standard
"Before 1927, the allocation of [broadcast] frequencies was
left entirely to the private sector, and the result was chaos."2%
response to this problem Congress enacted the Communications
Act of 1934,24establishing and empowering the Federal Communications Commission to regulate the broadcast media in the
"public interest, convenience and necessity"25and to "encourage
the larger and more effective use of radio."26The broad and flexible term "public interest" permeates the Communications Act,
and is the general principle under which a multitude of FCC
policies are subsumed, including those marshalling for and
. ~ ~particuagainst preserving media ownership c o n ~ e n t r a t i o n In
lar, the Commission's power to make rules forbidding the future
formation or transfer of commonly owned newspapers and broadcast stations in the same community stems from its duties to
determine eligibility standards in allocating broadcast frequencies and to enact rules preventing media concentration abuses.2x
22. The Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit's judgment upholding the Commission's prospective ban of newspaper-broadcast combinations in the same community, but
reversed the judgment vacating the Commission's limited divestiture order. 98 S. Ct. a t
2111.
23. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
24. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. $ 5 151-609 (1970)).
25. 47 U.S.C. 4 309(a)(1970).
26. Id. $ 303(g).
27. See National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d a t 947-49; Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1048.
28. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d a t 947-48; see FCC
v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. a t 2111.
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T h e standard for judicial review

Before evaluating the precedent and reasoning surrounding
the diversification issue, the standard for judicial review of administrative rulemaking must be considered in order to assess the
weight that should be accorded the Commission's judgment. By
providing the FCC with the broad and versatile public interest
standard, Congress has allowed the Commission to consider
"rapidly fluctuating factors" underlying the law and to establish
rules as the broadcasting field evolves.2g"By specialization, by
insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procethe Commission can more adeptly weigh the policy facd~re,"~O
tors of the public interest than any court. For these reasons the
Commission has been granted broad power to enact regulations
Its' policy determinations
in furtherance of the public i n t e r e ~ t . ~
constitute the very "area where administrative judgments are
entitled to the greatest amount of weight by the appellate
Therefore, serious doubt exists concerning the power of
a court to supplant the FCC's assessment of public interest factors with "one more nearly to its liking."33
A reviewing court may not reverse the Commission unless it
finds that the FCC rulemaking is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."34An administrative regulation may be set aside as arbitrary or capricious
only if the agency failed to make a "reasoned consideration [ofJ
each of the pertinent factors,"35and thus committed a clear error
of judgment.36Thus a court may reverse the FCC only if it finds
29. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138, 142-43 (1940). See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969) (quoting NBC v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943)), in which the Court stated that the FCC's mandate "to assure
that broadcasters operate in the public interest is a broad one, a power 'not niggardly but
expansive .' "
30. FCC v. RCA Broadcasting, Inc., 346 U.S. 86,96 (1953), (quoting Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1950)).
31. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943); see AT&Tv. United States, 299
U.S. 232, 236-37 (1936).
32. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947).
33. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968).
34. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
35. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,792 (1968);see Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,
34-35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
36. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285
(1974) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971)).
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969), in which the Supreme
Court noted that it is a "venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those
charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that
it is wrong."
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that there is no reasonable relationship between the public interest factors and the Commission's decision.
2.

Public interest and the first amendment

The public interest sometimes requires that the government
deny an individual a broadcast license because broadcast spectrum space is scarce.37The Supreme Court has affirmed the Commission's ruling that the public's interest in obtaining the optimal use of its limited airwaves is greater than the media's right
to freedom from government interference." Although normally
the first amendment is interpreted to prohibit government intrusion on free e x p r e ~ s i o nrecent
, ~ ~ decisions indicate that the Supreme Court continues to adhere to this "scarcity" rationale t o
justify affirmative government regulation of br~adcasting.~"
The NCCB Court cited Red Lion Broadcasting Co. u. FCC4'
and noted that the scarcity argument justifies government restrictions in spite of the first amendment." Although there is no
express statutory language permitting the FCC to restrict newspaper publishers from owning broadcast stations," the Court
noted that it is appropriate for the FCC to make extensive rules
to codify its understanding of the public interest, especially to
restrict increasing media c ~ n c e n t r a t i o nIn
. ~ the
~ Court's view, the
first amendment right to free speech is not abridged since the
37. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,226 (1943): "But Congress did not authorize
the Commission to choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic
or social views, or upon any other capricious basis."
38. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-90 (1969).
39. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 3 (1974).
40. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).
41. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
42. 98 S. Ct. a t 2114. Interestingly, Chief Judge Bazelon in writing for the D.C.
Circuit expressed his own view that because of new technology, including cable television,
the scarcity argument may be lost. If so, "[a]lleviating scarcity would not only eliminate
the need for promoting diversity, it would also presumably eliminate the need for all
licensing save that necessary to prevent interference. . . . Broadcasting would no longer
present unique problems requiring unique regulation." 555 F.2d a t 950 n.31. See B. OWEN,
AND FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION
107 (1975), reviewed by Posner, 86 YALEL.J. 567
ECONOMICS
(1977); Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKEL.J. 213,
223. See generally R. SMITH,THEWIREDNATION7 (1972); BROADCASTING,
July 19, 1976, a t
44.

43. In light of this lack of explicit authority, a recent law review comment recommends that Congress further clarify the scope of power given the FCC in this area. Comment, The Power of the FCC to Regulate Newspaper-Broadcast Cross-Ownership: The
Need for Congressional Clarification, 75 MICH.L. REV. 1708 (1977).
44. 98 S. Ct. a t 2111-13.
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proposed regulations are intended to enhance-not limitinformation diversity, and do not discriminate on the basis of
the broadcasters' social or political views." By encouraging
various broadcast voices through promulgation of rules against
multiple ~ w n e r s h i p , ~the
' FCC seeks greater message pluralism," thus contributing to "an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas."4u This diversity objective is consistent with the first
amendment:
The Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press
is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that the
government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not
afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose
restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom.49

Thus, government control is permissible to allay the "widespread
fear that . . . the public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting field."50

B. Diversity in Media Ownership Regulation
1.

Broadcast licensing

Although in granting new broadcast licenses the Commission
gives preference to applicants who add a new media owner to a
community," diversity has not been accorded the same import45. Id. a t 2114-15. These rules may not amount to a first amendment abridgment,
but might be limited by the general policy against government intervention. See text
accompanying note 162 infra.
46. "Multiple ownership'' in this context refers to ownership of more than one broadcast facility-standard (AM) broadcast stations, frequency modulated (FM) stations,
VHF or UHF television stations-by the same individual or company. See, e-g., 47 C.F.R.
Q 73.35(a) (1977).
47. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. a t 2107-08.
48. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U S . 367, 390 (1969).
49. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
50. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U S . 134, 137 (1940).
51. "[Tlhe 1965 Policy Statement promulgated the doctrine that in a comparative
situation an applicant not associated with other media interests should be given preferential consideration of primary significance as against applicants having other interests
. . . ." Hyde, FCC Policy and Procedures Relating to Hearings on Broadcast Applications
in Which a New Applicant Seeks to Displace a Licensee Seeking Renewal, 1975DUKEL.J.
253, 253 (emphasis added)(commenting on the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 395 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Policy Statement]).
Former FCC Chairman Rose1 H. Hyde wrote that this policy elevated the "diversification
criterion to equal status as 'service to the public.' " Id. a t 263. See McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U S . 917 (1957)(where all
other factors were substantially equal between two new applicants, the FCC appropriately
awarded the license to the one disassociated from other media interests).
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ance in cases where an incumbent licensee seeks to renew a license for another three years.52Historically, ownership diversity
has often been neglected as a factor in license renewal hearings;
rather, an incumbent's previous record has been emphasized because it has been regarded as a more reliable indicator of future
service than a new applicant's untested proposals.53
In 1969, however, the FCC caused a furor in the broadcast
industry when for the first time it refused to renew the license of
a broadcast station (WHDH) that had an "average" record of
p e r f ~ r m a n c eInstead,
.~~
the Commission granted the license to an
applicant that would add to the diversity of control over mass
communications media in the area and be more actively involved
in the station's operation.55Even there, however, the FCC gave
diversity controlling weight only due to a unique factual situation. The action was challenged in Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC (WHDH).56The D.C. Circuit affirmed the Commission's decision to give diversity prime consideration and noted
that WHDH was treated as a new applicant only because "unique
events and procedures . . . place[d] WHDH in a substantially
different posture from the conventional applicant for renewal of
a broadcast license. "57
In response to the uncertainty caused by the D.C. Circuit
decision in WHDH, the FCC promulgated a policy statement
that essentially precluded consideration of diversity by permitting incumbent licensees to forgo comparative hearings if they
can first show "substantial" previous p e r f o r m a n ~ eIn
. ~ ~Citizens
52. When the FCC adopted the policy in favor of diversity in new license proceedings,
it noted that it was not attempting to deal with the somewhat different problems raised
in comparative renewal proceedings. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 51, a t 393, n.1.
53. See Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp., 35 F.C.C. 677, 679 (1963); Hearst Radio,
Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1178 (1951). Licenses have been renewed routinely. Jaffe, WHDH:
The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HAW. L. REV.1693, 1694 (1969). In
renewal proceedings the FCC has considered several factors and applied differing weights
depending on the circumstances.
supra note 11, a t 23, 26.
54. W: GORMLEY,
55. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), aff'd, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
56. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
57. Id. at 849 (quoting WHDH, Inc., 17 F.C.C.2d 856, 873 (1969)). Over a 12-year
period, WHDH had always been granted operating authorization for less than the normal
three-year period. In view of the abbreviated nature of the WHDH tenure, the station was
never considered a conventional applicant for renewal possessing "legitimate renewal
expectancies." Id. at 849, 854.
58. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal
Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424,425-26 (1970). Media interests had also encouraged Congress
to combat the anticipated negative effects of WHDH. Senator John Pastore introduced
legislation barring the FCC from considering a competitive application unless the incum-
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Communications Center v. FCC59the D.C. Circuit held that this
statement did not conform to statutory authority. The court reasoned that by granting renewal to an incumbent upon a showing
of substantial performance the FCC precluded challengers from
receiving a hearing on their own. applications, contrary to the
express provision in the Communications Act requiring a full
hearing if a substantial or material question of fact is presented
by a competing a p p l i c a t i ~ nHowever,
.~~
in spite of the decisions
in WHDH and Citizens Communications Center, the courts still
allow for "legitimate renewal expectancie~"~~
and judge incumbent licensees "primarily on their records of past perf~rmance."~~
In the eight years since WHDH the Commission has never
granted a television license to a challenger when the incumbent
has maintained a t least an average record of past performance in
the public interest." The FCC has recently taken the position
that a record of meritorious service-and not diversity-may be
c~ntrolling.~~
2.

Rules restricting media ownership concentration

The concentration of ownership once afforded the media industry has been restricted in stages. The 1940 FM rule provided
that in the future no person should own or control more than one
station in the same market unless he shouldered the burden of
bent failed to serve the public interest. S. 2004,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969);see 115 CONG.
REc. 10632 (1969). Hearings were held on these new license renewal procedures, but the
bill was dropped because the Communications Subcommittee did not report it out of
committee that year. W. GORMLEY,
supra note 11, a t 26-27. Similar legislation was proposed in 1974. See note 63 infra.
59. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
60. Id. at 1211-14. The hearing is required by 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970).
61. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 854 (1970).
62. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
See Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 698-702 (D.C. Cir. 1975), in which the
court of appeals supported the Commission's consideration of past service and separation
between ownership and station management in renewing a broadcast license. Normally
the Commission gives substantial credit to local ownership in comparative hearings and
seeks high integration between owner and manager.
THEP O L ~ COFS BROADCAST
REGULATION
204 (2d ed. 1978). Both the
63. I. KRASNOW,
House of Representatives and the Senate passed license renewal bills in 1974 which would
have granted incumbent licensees a presumption in favor of renewal if they were
"substantially" responsive to local needs, regardless of diversity. The bills were not enacted because a conference committee was never assigned to "iron out" the differences
supra note 11, a t 30-33.
between the House and Senate versions of the bill. W. GORMLEY,
64. See Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Comparative Hearing Process, 42 Fed. Reg.
19379 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Broadcast Renewal Policies]. The Commission
recently did not award a preference to a challenger even though the incumbent owned both
AM and FM stations in the same city as the television station in question; Fidelity
Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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showing that competition would be fostered or a distinct service
rendered. Existing FM combinations in the same city were grandfathered?
In 1941 the Commission promulgated rules restricting multiple ownership of both AM and FM stationP in an attempt to
strike a balance between the policies favoring diversity and economic competition and the need to avoid undue disruption of
existing services.67These chain-broadcastingsRregulations, sustained by the Supreme Court, were designed to curb abuses that
the FCC had discovered and to limit the existing networks' inordinate control of the media? The rules required divestiture only
where two AM stations were controlled by the same network in
the same area, or where the available facilities were so few that
. ~ ~ the Commission later
the network had no c ~ m p e t i t i o n When
barred single parties from owning two AM broadcast stations in
the same community, divestiture was required in twenty cases."
At approximately the same time, the Supreme Court in
Associated Press v. United States72found the Associated Press'
membership restraints illegal because they ultimately deprived
the public of information from diverse sources, in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.73
~ ~ Supreme
In United States v. Storer Broadcasting C O . , the
Court upheld the FCC multiple ownership rule limiting a licensee
to five VHF television stations, and found a full hearing unnecessary unless it could be shown that in a particular case the rule
65. See note 6 supra for an overview of the early multiple ownership rules, including
those restricting ownership of FM stations.
66. Rules and Regulations Governing Commercial Television Broadcast Stations, 6
Fed. Reg. 2282 (1941).
67. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 218 (1943).
68. Chain broadcasting refers to the simultaneous broadcasting of one program by
two or more connected stations.
69. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The record of monopolistic improprieties was strong. Id. a t 21?-18. The decision recognized apparent antitrust violations although the resolution of the case did not rely on antitrust policy. Id. a t 191, 223.
70. Howard, Multiple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory History, 27 FED. COM.B.J.
1, 6-7 (1974).
71. When more strict standards were set for determining overlap of co-located stations, no divestiture was required. Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of
the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television
Broadcast Stations, 45 F.C.C. 1476 (1964).
72. 326 U.S. 1 (1944).
73. Id. at 12. The Associated Press abused its media concentration posture by excluding certain newspapers from receiving its news service reports. The wire service's members
"pooled their economic and news control power and in exerting that power, have entered
into agreements plainly designed in the interest of preventing competition." Id. a t 16.
74. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
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should be waived. The five-station limit was based on the Commission's experience in assessing concentration of media
"coupled with a design to avoid undue disruption of existing station o ~ n e r s h i p . " ~ ~
In 1970 the Commission adopted an as-yet-unchallenged
"one to a market" rule to prohibit a single party from gaining
control of two or more full-time broadcast stations within a single
community. This rule did not require divestiture of existing combinations, although it did prohibit the future sale of an existing
combination to a single party.'$
Similarly, the FCC has restricted the ownership of cable television systems. The Commission effectively prevented telephone
companies from providing cable television service to their teleand forbade the ownership or control of cable
phone cu~tomers,~'
systems by national television networks or television broadcast
.~~
the Commission
stations in the same c o r n m ~ n i t yAlthough
chose not to grandfather existing television-cable combinations
as a matter of course, enforcement of this ruling has been liberally
waived.79In 1975 the FCC decided against establishing a rule to
restrict newspaper publishers from owning cable systems because
it found no abusive trends resulting from the cross-ownership.Ro

The FCC in the course of its rulemaking proceedings compared the extent. of local programming, information diversity,
75. Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 55, 56 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
(on remand). In the few instances where the number limit was exceeded, the divestiture
was dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of
the Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television
Broadcast Stations, 18 F.C.C.2d 288, 292, 295 (1953).
Relying on Storer the D.C. Circuit held that divestiture can be ordered without
individual hearings because a hearing is unnecessary when the Commission finds an
applicant unqualified by application of standards set to further the public interest. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the economic loss to a station owner ordered to divest
is not as great as the loss to an owner whose license is simply not renewed, since the
divested owner can always sell his license while the applicant denied renewal has no
license interest to sell. 555 F.2d at 955-56.
76. First Report and Order, supra note 6, at 306.
77. 47 C.F.R. § 63.54 (1977).
78. 47 C.F.R. 8 76.501(a) (1977). The original regulation was approved in General Tel.
Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
& K. POSSNER,
CONCENTRATION
OF MASS
79. W. BAER,H. GELLER,J. GRUNDFEST,
MEDIAOWNERSHIP:
ASSESSING
THE STATE
OF CURRENT
KNOWLEDGE
29 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as W. BAER].
80. Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to
Diversification of Control of Community Antenna Television Systems, 52 F.C.C.2d 170,
171 (1975).
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public affairs programming, and advertising rates of newspaperowned stations with the same characteristics of independently
held stationsu1and concluded as did the D.C. Circuitx2that the
"record no more establishes that cross-ownership serves the public interest than injures it."83 Because of this inconclusive record,
the Commission ruled that there was no overwhelming need for
divestiture except in one-newspaper, one-broadcast communities
where "competition and diversity are absent?' The D.C. Circuit,
however, asserted that "precisely the opposite presumption is
compelled, and that divestiture is required except in those cases
where the evidence clearly discloses that cross-ownership is in the
public interest."" The Supreme Court in effect upheld the FCC
because it was "unable to find anything in the Communications
Act, the First Amendment, or the Commission's past or present
practices" that supports a presumption that diversity should be
given controlling weight in all c i r c ~ m s t a n c e s . ~ ~

A. Broadcast Licensing Procedures
Analysis of licensing disputes shows that the Commission
has balanced several factors in deciding whether to grant or deny
license renewaW7 While in awarding new licenses the Commission requires that ownership diversity be accorded "primary sign i f i c a n ~ e , "as
~ the Supreme Court noted this policy has never
been applied directly in a comparative hearing for license
renewaP9 Since the divestiture issue concerns only existing
81. Brief for Respondent at 9 n.6, National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC,
555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978).
82. 555 F.2d at 956-61.
83. See W. BAER,supra note 79, a t 79; Leuchter, Media Cross-Ownership-The
FCC's Inadequate Response, 54 TEX.L. REV. 336, 369 (1976).
84. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, at 1088 n.29.
85. 555 F.2d at 966.
86. 98 S. Ct. a t 2119-20.
87. Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chancellor's Foot, 47 GEO.L.J. 655,
660-61 (1959). The factors listed by Schwartz include: (1)local ownership, (2) integration
of ownership and management, (3) past performance, (4) broadcast experience, (5) proposed programming and policies, and (6) diversity of the media of mass communication.
Schwartz criticizes past FCC inconsistency and political favoritism and advocates administrative changes-including controlled competitive bidding for broadcast licenses-without recommending greater emphasis for diversified ownership.
88. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 51, at 394. Full-time participation in station
operation by owners and "past performance" are only of "substantial importance," thus
apparently of less merit. Other factors do not warrant an affirmative preference and are
considered only if on petition by one of the parties the factor is studied and reveals a
substantial difference between applicants for a new license. Other factors include proposed program service, efficient use of frequency, and applicant character. Id. at 393-400.
89. 98 S. Ct. at 2120.
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media owners, the policy relating to license renewals, rather than
new applications, should apply.
In license renewal proceedings the "relative weight" to be
afforded the evidence once entered "will depend on the facts of
the particular case?"' Diversity has never been the overriding
factor, but merely one of several factors in the successful applicant's favorY The Commission considers the anticipated contribution of the owner to station operations and proposed programming, and generally accords central importance to the incumbent's past p e r f ~ r m a n c e The
. ~ ~ diversification factor assumes a
greater significance only if a license renewal would perpetuate a
serious monopoly,93documented abuses,g4or a violation of existing media ownership rules.95Thus, the Commission clearly does
90. 1977 Broadcast Renewal Policies, supra note 64, at 19384. See Belo Broadcasting
Corp., 47 F.C.C.2d 540,544 (1974); Seven League Productions, Inc., 1F.C.C.2d 1597,1598
(1965).
The D.C. Circuit appeared to be confused concerning the 1965 Policy Statement's
application. Chief Judge Bazelon cited the above two cases for the proposition that the
policy is not applicable to "noncomparative hearings." 555 F.2d at 944 n.9. He apparently
intended to state that the FCC does apply the policy in a renewal context although the
1965 FCC statement is expressly not applicable to incumbent licensees. Rather, these
cases show that the policy has not been employed to weigh competing considerations in
the final decision, but only applies to the introduction of evidence for renewal applications. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 854 (1970).
Chief Judge Bazelon also erroneously cited the policy as the "1965 Policy Statement
on Comparative Renewal Hearings," 555 F.2d at 944 n.9 (emphasis added), although its
correct title is "1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings." See note 51
supra. Similar confusion exists at 555 F.2d at 963 n.94.
91. For example, in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 189 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951), the Commission was upheld in finding that a combination of ownership diversity, integration of local ownership and management, and familiarity with local conditions served as the basis for granting a radio license. See Chicagoland
TV Co., 11 F.C.C.2d 119 (1967).
92. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. a t 2105 & n.5.
93. The Commission's refusal to renew a television broadcast station in Frontier
Broadcasting Co., 27 F.C.C.2d 486 (1971), was upheld because of Frontier's extreme media
monopoly in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The family-owned corporation owned the town's only
television station, the only full-time AM radio station, an FM radio station, the only cable
television system, and the only daily newspaper. Id. at 486. In Chicagoland TV Co., 11
F.C.C.2d 119 (1967), diversity was of "reduced significance because of the multiplicity of
other services available" in the Chicago area. Id. at 137. Although the successful applicant
already owned a powerful radio station and a monthly newspaper, it was awarded the
license because of its financial capability, integration of ownership and management, and
superiority in coverage and service contour.
94. Because a radio license applicant, the owner of the only newspaper in town, had
in the past used exclusive advertising contracts, boycotts, and other monopolistic methods
in attempting to destroy the existing radio station in the area, his application was denied.
Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
95. Citizens TV Protest Comm. v. FCC, 348 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Commission
abused discretion in granting license for television station without a hearing where result
was common ownership of a community antenna television system and local television
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not ips0 facto grant "controlling weight" to ownership diversity
in renewal hearings. Although as a general rule diversity must be
accorded some importance, its weight relative to other factors
depends upon the particular situation?

B. Other Multiple Ownership Rulings
Despite the absence of an affirmative showing of abuse arising out of common ownership, the D.C. Circuit reversed the Commission and set down a virtually irrebuttable presumption
against cross-o~nership.~'The D .C. Circuit cited several FCC
regulations in an attempt to support its statement that "diversity
is central to the Communications Act."" These regulations, however, are direct attempts a t increasing information diversity, not
merely ownership diversity, by curbing documented abuses?
The Supreme Court found the FCC's ruling to be consistent
with both the Commission's previous rulings and with court decis i o n ~ .When
'~
the Court sustained the Commission's regulations
against chain broadcasting in NBC v. United States,lO' it recognized that diversity was a significant factor in the public interest,
but required divestiture only upon a showing of the network's
misuse of commonly owned media. NBC's exclusive arrangestation in the same town in violation of FCC multiple ownership rule); Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (Commission license grant successfully
protested where grant would result in a violation of existing multiple ownership rules
because one party would own two television stations serving substantially the same area).
96. See Comment, Comparing the Incomparable: Towards a Structural Model for
FCC Comparative Broadcast License Renewal Hearings, 43 U . CHI. L. REV. 573 (1976).
97. 555 F.2d a t 963.
98. 555 F.2d a t 948 n.26.
99. For example, the licensing policies for AM and FM stations have been designed
to control such network abuses as (1) affiliation exclusivity, (2) territorial exclusivity over
network programming, (3) contractual ties with networks for excessively long periods, (4)
unlimited network preemption of local station time, (5) restrictions on station rejection
rights, (6) network organization ownership of more than one station in an area, (7) "dual"
network operation, and (8) network control of station advertising rates. See 47 C.F.R. 08
73.132, .139, .232, .239-.240, .242 (1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 16,421-22 (1977). Diversity is not
the central aim of the regulation that requires flexibility in program arrangements and
calls for local programming during specific evening hours. 47 C.F.R. 0 73.658 (1977). The
regulation emphasizes local programming geared to local issues. Here the FCC concern is
not that networks present amply diverse views, but rather that the views be well-suited
to local needs. A decision also cited by the D.C. Circuit, Metropolitan Television Co. v.
FCC, 289 F.2d 874,876 (D.C. Cir. 1961),upheld the prohibition of network sale of nonnetwork time. The court found an abuse because this type of network control restricted the
individual licensee's independence. Since this abuse can exist even though every single
affiliate is separately owned, it is clear that information diversity and not ownership
diversity was the controlling consideration for this court.
100. 98 S. Ct. a t 2120.
101. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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ments were found to prevent the airing of others' ideas and programs in an area served by a network affiliate, while network
regulation of advertising rates severely restricted economic competition. Thus across-the-board breakup of AM station ownership
or control was ordered only because concentration of ownership
and monopolistic abuse were serious.'02
Although no two AM stations controlled by the same network
in the same community were allowed to continue, this does not
apply today to newspaper-broadcast combinations. Because the
national network provides a major part of programming for local
stations, the potential damage to the public interest is much
greater in the chain-broadcasting context than in the area of local
newspaper-broadcast combinations. Community newspaperbroadcast combinations do not monopolize one branch of the
media and do not wield nationwide control. In Associated Press,
as in NBC, the Supreme Court relied on a finding of abuse in
ordering a stop to practices "plainly designed in the interest of
preventing competition. "Io3
In contrast, a pattern of monopolistic abuse has not been
demonstrated in the cross-ownership of newspapers and broadcast stations. There exists no evidence of an effort to censor or
monopolize ideas or to obtain unfair commercial advantage over
competitor^.^^ Most studies testing the possible harm to the public interest resulting from newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership
have found no significant difference between individually and
cross-owned stations.lo5A recent comprehensive study of past research found most of the allegations concerning the positive or
102. The "chain broadcasting" decision recognized apparent antitrust violations, but
did not employ antitrust principles to resolve the case. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S.
at 191, 221-23. The Justice Department would find it substantially difficult to show th?t
newspaper-broadcast combinations have violated the antitrust laws. Leuchter, supra
note 83, at 344-45,370;see Bennett, Media Concentration and the FCC: Focusing With a
Section Seven Lens, 66 Nw. L. REV. 159, 187 (1971). The Justice Department, however,
unsuccessfully urged the court of appeals to reverse by giving antitrust policy "prima facie
effect." 555 F.2d at 965 n.107. The court of appeals was correct in denying this argument's
validity. See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67,86-87 (1944). Moreover,
"encouragement of competition as such has not been considered the single or controlling
reliance for safeguarding the public interest." FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346
U.S. 86, 93 (1953).
103. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. at 16.
104. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d at 959. This abuse
could be manifested by a newspaper-broadcast combination's one-sided treatment of
stories in which it has an interest, a newspaper's favored treatment to radio and television
listings of its co-owned station, cut rates to those who advertise in both halves of a combination, and use of the same reporter and information by both the newspaper and broadcast station in order to tell a news story.
105. These studies were summarized by the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 957.
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negative effects of media ownership concentration on media performance not proven.lo6In the absence of evidence indicating that
diversity of ideas or competition is restricted due to media concentration, the case for divestiture is weak or nonexistent.lo7Thus
the FCC was reasonable in concluding that divestiture is too drastic a remedy in most cases of cross-ownership. Although it is
likely that evidence showing abuses of cross-ownership is difficult
to collect, the mere possibility of impropriety is not a sufficient
basis for ordering the separation of all co-located newspaperbroadcast combinations. Because newspaper-broaacast crossownership has not been shown to restrict information diversity,
rules restricting cross-ownership would be only an indirect, speculative manner of insuring diversity of ideas.

C . Diversity of Ownership v. Diversity of Ideas
In treating the newpaper-broadcast cross-ownership issue,
both the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court ignored the fact
that the Commission's "primary concern is diversity in programming service,"lo8not simply diversity of ownership. While ownership in some circumstances carries with it the power to edit, alter,
and select information,lo9the amount and degree to which this
power is actually used is undocumented. The FCC rationally concluded that because there was no evidence of a lack of program
or information variety due to common ownership, it would order
divestiture only in the most serious cases of ownership concentration where message pluralism is more likely to be restrictedY0 In
contrast, the D.C. Circuit based its decision to require divestiture
in all cases on the unproven premise that the increase in the
number of owners resulting from divestiture would increase the
diversity of views receiving public airing? Admittedly, the pub106. W. BAER,supra note 79, a t ix. A report made since the oral arguments before
the FCC concerning the regulations indicates that cross-ownership increases to a small
degree (16.7%) the likelihood that co-located newspapers and broadcast stations will carry
the same stories. Half of this story overlap is attributed to three factors: carbon-sharing
(newspaper provides co-owned station with copies of all articles, and vice versa), crossemployment, and location of the station and newspaper in the same complex of buildings.
The report's author, however, does not recommend across-the-board divestiture. W.
GORMLEY,
supra note 11, a t 210-11 & nn. 11-12.
107. See Amendment of Part 76.of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative
to Diversification of Control of Community Antenna Television Systems, 52 F.C.C.2d 170,
171 (1975).
108. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, at 1079 n.27, 1080.
109. Id. a t 1050.
110. Id. a t 1080.
111. 555 F.2d at 950. However, it is at least arguable that a co-located newspaper-
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lic has a right implied from the first amendment to hear a wide
range of ideas or messages.l12However, because the gains in message pluralism resulting from increased diversity of ownership are
only speculative, the diversification argument is significantly
weakened.
Other means for securing the public interest in diverse viewpoints already exist. For example, the "fairness doctrine" requires that radio and television broadcasters, as public trustees,
provide coverage of issues of public importance and present both
sides of the issues fairly.l13Similarly, the "equal time" provisions
provide a safeguard for fair and diversified treatment of political
campaigns,l14 and the "prime time access rule" encourages
"diverse and antagonistic sources of program service" during evening hours to "correct a situation where only three organizations
control access to the crucial prime time evening television schedule."l15 These existing provisions promote diversity of information
without the disadvantageous side effects of a rule requiring
across-the-board divestiture. 116

D. Reduced Cross-Ownership and Technological Progress
The D.C.Circuit feared that should the FCC decision to
grandfather the majority of existing newspaper-broadcast combinations be upheld, transfers of only a few co-located combinations would not realistically dissipate the concentration of ownership. Recently compiled statistics, however, indicate the court's
fears are unfounded. In 1950, 40.2% of the nation's commercial
television stations were owned or controlled by local newspapers,
while the percentage in 1975 was 10.4. In 1955there were 127 such
combinations; today there are only 65."'
broadcast combination could devote more resources to newsgathering and consequently
provide greater diversity of viewpoints than if separately owned.
112. The assumption that diversity of information is of first amendment importance
is a logical twist of the amendment. The Bill of Rights was written to protect free speech
from government infringement, but court decisions suggest that the government also
must guarantee the citizen's right to hear various and differing views. See Note, The
Listener's Right to Hear to Broadcasting, 22 STAN.L. REV. 863, 869 (1970).
113. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257-58 (1949). Adherence to this doctrine is the single most important requirement of broadcast operation in
the public interest. Committee for t h e Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 25
F.C.C.2d 283, 292 (1970).
114. 47 U.S.C. 4 315 (1970).
115. Mount Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 1971).
116. See notes 120-50 and accompanying text infra.
117. Brief for Petitioner FCC a t 7, 8 & n.14, FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978).

6751

MEDIA DIVERSITY AND DIVESTITURE

693

The argument that under the Supreme Court's ruling in
NCCB the newspaper-broadcast concentration will persist is further diluted by the possibility that progress in technology may
eliminate scarcity of broadcast space, thus weakening the justification for broadcast regulation and emphasis on diversity of ownership.l18Cable television, satellites, fine tuning, and other developments could make scarcity a bygone concern. These realistic
possibilities for the future, some of which are beginning to materialize in the form of cable television, should serve to limit somewhat the concern over concentration of ownership.

The Supreme Court recognized the Commission's ultimate
goal of providing for the "best practicable service to the public"
and found a rational basis for the Commission's cross-ownership
rule in the FCC's belief that divestiture would often result in a
decrease in local ownership and management, a disruption of
continuity and stability of public service, and an increase in private economic losses.11gAlthough perhaps no one of these factors
alone overrides diversification policy, together they substantially
discredit diversity as a controlling factor.

A. Local Ownership
In various rulemaking proceedings the Commission has considered the extent to which a proposed rule will affect local ownership or control of broadcasting facilities.120Such consideration is
warranted by a belief that local control is likely to result in more
community service and a keener awareness and coverage of local
The FCC's limited divestiture order would have broken u p seven televisionnewspaper combinations. Six transfers proposed during the last year are now awaiting
approval by the FCC, including two recently proposed in a "swap" between the Washington Post Company (WTOP-TV) and the Evening News Association (WWJ-TV) of Detroit.
BROADCASTING,
Dec. 12, 1977, a t 20. Although figures are not available, a similar trend
exists for newspaper-radio combinations. Brief for Petitioner FCC a t 8 n.14.
118. Economic realities, however, will not permit an unlimited number of broadcasters to operate successfully.
119. 96 S. Ct. a t 2116-17.
120. In an effort to restrict national monopolies from inhibiting local control, the
Commission limits one party to seven AM stations, seven FM stations and seven TV
stations (five of which may be VHF). Television Multiple Ownership, 9 Fed. Reg. 5442
(1942). Networks proposing acquisitions of more than three TV stations in the top 50
markets have been required to show a compelling public interest to justify the purchases,
although the Commission has always approved the license applications. W. BAER,supra
note 79, at 19.
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issues.121Thus the FCC often emphasizes the significance of local
pr~gramrningl~~
and participation of owners in management.123
The D.C. Circuit took a contrary position and suggested that
local ownership offers no promise that station policy will be attuned to local needs.124The likelihood, however, that local interests will be better served by local ownership is just as great as the
probability that increased diversity of information will result
from increased diversity of ownership.
At present seventy-five percent of all newspaper-broadcast
combinations are locally owned. The Supreme Court approved of
the Commission's "rational prediction"lZ that the many sales
required by divestiture would be to outside interests, especially
if widespread trading occurred among those required to divest
Proponents of divestiture suggested that decreases in local ownership be prevented by providing local groups the first opportunity
to purchase a divested station, or requiring multiple bids? These
requirements, however, would probably violate section 310(b) of
the Communications Act.lZ8Although local ownership may not be
a concern in every case, across-the-board divestiture should not
be ordered without consideration of this factor.
121. W. GORMLEY,
supra note 11, at 185-88. See generally, WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d
1, 74-94, 103-35 (1969).
122. 1977 Broadcast Renewal Policies, supra note 64, at 19381. See, e.g., United
States v. Midwest Video Corp. 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (upheld rule requiring cable television
systems to originate some local programs); Simmons v. FCC, 169 F.2d 6?0 (D.C. Cir.)
(power increase and frequency change denied because of applicant's failure to tailor programs to local needs), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 846 (1948); 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1977) (regulation requiring local television programming geared to local issues).
123. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 51, at 395. See, e.g., Chicagoland TV Co., 11
F.C.C.2d 119, 137 (1967) (integration of ownership and management found central in new
license application comparison).
124. 555 F.2d a t 963. The court observed that no evidence was presented showing that
local owners are involved in daily management, especially since most newspapers and
broadcast stations have separate management. Id. a t 964. The Supreme Court, however,
pointed out that separate management "does not foreclose the possibility that the common owner participates in management" of one or the other. 98 S. Ct. a t 2117 n.23.
125. 98 S. Ct. a t 2119.
126. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1078. See note 117 supra. Figures
do not exist to show the number of recent transfers that have resulted in decreased local
ownership.
127. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1069.
128. 47 U.S.C. 4 310(b) (1970). This section provides that a transfer cannot be approved except upon a finding that the "public interest, convenience, and necessity will
be served thereby." The Commission, however, may not consider whether the public
interest might be better served by a transfer to a person other than the proposed transferee.
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B. Continuity and Stability of Pub lie Service
The FCC has always regarded the need to preserve continuity of public service as a limitation on the applicability of its
multiple ownership rules. Thus most of its rules operate prospectively
and when divestiture is ordered, it is "coupled with
a design to avoid undue disruption of existing station ownership."130The court of appeals questioned the significance of the
disruption-to-service factor because of its apparent inconsistency
with the Commission's practice of routinely permitting existing
broadcasters to assign their licenses to others.131Although license
assignments are allowed, the FCC has expressed great concern a t
the high rate of license turnover and now requires a hearing to
approve license transfers during the first three-year license
term.132Furthermore, as the Supreme Court pointed out, " '[tlhe
question of whether the Commission should compel proven licensees to divest their stations is a different question from whether
the public interest is served by allowing transfers by licensees who
no longer wish to continue in business.'
The resultant forced
broadcasting may then be continuous, but probably not "worth
preserving. "Is4
Licensees need time to fully implement the proposals made
in their original license applications in order to "gain a better
understanding of the program needs and desires of the community, and to adjust programing to such needs and interest^."^^
The Supreme Court's decision protects the public's interest in
being served by those stations that have demonstrated a long
129. See note 6 supra.
130. Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 55, 56 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
These rules prohibiting one party from owning more than seven AM stations, seven FM,
and five VHF-TV stations were set so as not to be "unduly disruptive." Amendment of
Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 18 F.C.C. 288,292 (1953). The 15 VHF
stations owned and operated by the three networks serve markets reaching one-third of
all television households in the United States and generate one-sixth of the advertising
revenue reported for all stations. W. BAER,supra note 79, a t 46. See also NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 206-07 (1943), in which the Supreme Court, in affirming the chainbroadcasting regulations, implicitly approved the Commission's decision against requiring
extensive divestiture.
131. 555 F.2d at 964.
132. 47 C.F.R. 8 1.597 (1977).
133. 98 S. Ct. a t 2121.
134. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner FCC a t 38, FCC v. National Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978)).
135. Amendment of Part I of the Commission's Rules Adding Section 1.365 Concerning Application for Voluntary Assignments of Transfers of Control, 32 F.C.C. 689, 690
(1962).
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term commitment to broadcasting and have learned to meet the
special needs of the community.136This concern is well represented by an amicus curiae statement filed by the State of Utah
in support of the FCC's petition for certiorari. The statement
maintains that through divestiture Utah citizens would be deprived of a quality station, with the possibility that the successor
would not meet the same high standards.l"

C. Prevention of Economic Loss
Private economic loss can be a factor when shown to have an
l ~ ~example, the threat
adverse effect on service to the ~ u b 1 i c . For
of economic ruin to an existing station, with the resulting loss of
service to the public, has caused the Commission to deny applications to add media facilities in a particular community.139Divestiture could force the demise of newspapers held in combination
with broadcast stations where the newspapers are operating on a
marginal budget." Thus, grandfathering the majority of existing
combinations is consistent with the policy of the Newspaper Preservation Act, in which Congress chose not to require the separation of newspaper combinations in order to prevent a decline in
the total number of newspapers serving the public.141If grand136. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. a t 2118.
137. Statement in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari a t 2-3, FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978).
138. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d a t 964.
139. The D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission's denial of an application for the
introduction of a CATV system into a rural area in Carter Mountain Transmission Corp.
v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1973). The court agreed with
the Commission that the existing local broadcast station could better serve local needs
and its possible demise would result in a loss of vital service, thus depriving the community of free television. No increase in diversity of competition or ideas could outweigh
the local service factor. Thus the Commission was correct in using a "net effect" test,
instead of concentrating solely on diversity. Id. a t 365-66. Similarly, the D.C. Circuit
allowed an existing radio station to contest the application for a second station in the area
on the grounds that the market could not support both. Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The overabundance of economic competition would have
affected the quality of service to the public because one financially stable stat.ion can
better meet the public need than two competing diverse voices that are both financially
weak. Id. a t 443.
140. The Boston Herald died from financial difficulty shortly after the Commission
forced it to divest its wholly owned subsidiary, WHDH-TV. Second Report and Order,
supra note 2, a t 1107. Divestiture appears more likely to result in the demise of newspapers
than of broadcast stations. Id. a t 1067, 1107.
141. Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. $5 1801-1804 (1976). If a newspaper can
show that it would fail without financial backing from its co-owned station, the Commission would grant waiver. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1085. This may have
met the concern for the viability of the newspapers, although the burden of showing the
need for waiver was left with the newspaper publisher.
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fathering were permitted for this reason, it would be in deference
to private economic interests although in consideration of the
overall public interest. lt2
In addition to private financial concern, a financially stable
station is less subject to pressure from advertisers and others to
alter informationlt3 and more able to adequately represent the
minor as well as the dominant forces in a community.lt4Economic
stability also better enables existing owners to contribute to the
development of new and varied media sources, such as UHF.lW

D. Summary
Because the Commission has acquired the appropriate power
from Congress and has developed significant expertise over the
years in assessing policies relevant to broadcast media, its decisions should be given great deference. As the D.C. Circuit said in
WHDH, "Avoiding concentration of control in communication is
such an important objective that the Commission must be accorded discretion in choice of measures for its f ~ l f i l l r n e n t . " ~ ~ ~
Thus, the reviewing court must leave the "FCC to consider diversification of control in connection with all other relevant factors
and to attach such significance to it as its judgment dictates."147
The D.C. Circuit did not defer to the FCC's judgment.lt8 The
There is, however, no substantial evidence of joint-operating economies between
cross-owned newspapers and broadcast stations, W. BAER,supra note 79, a t 60-62, nor is
it clear that broadcast stations financially support newspapers. National Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d a t 965.
142. The power to grandfather has the same justifications as the power to prohibit
newspapers from owning broadcast stations in the same community, although the effect
is the opposite.
143. See Mills, Moynahan, Perlini, & McClure, The Constitutional Considerations
of Multiple Media Ownership Regulation by the Federal Communications Commission,
24 AM. U.L. REV.1217, 1237 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mills].
144. See H. LEVIN,BROADCAST
REGULATION
AND JOINT
OWNERSHIP
OF MEDIA29 (1960).
145. See Howard, supra note 70, a t 54-55.
146. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,860 (D.C. Cir. 1970),cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
147. McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957).
148. The D.C. Circuit also erred in remanding the record to the Commission for
adoption of a rule requiring divestiture. Normally, it is a "guiding principle" that the
"function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the
matter once more goes to the Commission for reconsideration." FPC v. Idaho Power Co.,
344 U.S. 17,20 (1952). If an appellate court decides the importance of a factor, the exercise
of discretion in reassessing all factors remains open to the agency. United States v. Saskatchewan Minerals, 385 U.S. 94,95 (1966); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 US. 194, 208-09
(1947). Therefore, even if the court of appeals had been correct in reversing the FCC's
policy judgment, it should only have remanded "for proceedings not inconsistent" with
its opinion.
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Supreme Court, however, found sufficient rational support for the
FCC's conclusions to uphold the Commission's determination
that the public interest is best served by preserving existing
newspaper-broadcast combinations except in the "egregious"
cases of one-newspaper, one-broadcast communities. ld9 The FCC
gave extensive consideration to a variety of public interest factors
relative to diversity of ownership, including the absence of facts
showing abuse from newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership, the
trend toward decreased cross-ownership, the impact of diversity
of ownership on message pluralism, the benefits of local ownership and management, and the potential disruption to private
interests and public service. In view of the fact that diversity of
ownership has never been considered the overriding element in
determining the public interest, the Commission rationally concluded that it should not be given "controlling weight."lJO

IV. IMPLICATIONS
OF THE RULEPROHIBITING
CO-LOCATED
CROSS
OWNERSHIP
A. Benefits of the Rule
The FCC rule as approved by the Supreme Court restores
certainty to a troubled area of broadcast regulation. Media owners had often complained of the inability to predict the impact
of the diversification-of-ownership factor in licensing proceedings.lJ1The rule, however, now clearly identifies those owners to
be divested. To preserve this certainty, diversity should not be
considered a controlling factor in denying license renewal.lJ2The
Supreme Court wisely recognized, and thereby assured those
owners not divested under the rule, that "diversification of ownership will be a relevant but somewhat secondary factor" in renewal proceedings.lJ3
Furthermore, because diversity will be controlled by rule,
those owners to be divested should not suffer substantial eco149. 98 S. Ct. a t 2121-22.
150. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, at 1069.
151. See 1977 Broadcast Renewal Policies, supra note 64, a t 19380.
152. Both the Commission and the D.C. Circuit prefer rulemaking. See, e.g., Stone
v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir.
1970). The FCC's position is further apparent from its recent recommendation that comparative license hearings to select between two or more applicants be abolished. 1977
Broadcast Renewal Policies, supra note 64, a t 19383. Moreover, had Congress been successful in its attempts to enact legislation precluding a comparative hearing if an incumbent could show substantial performance, see notes 58, 63 supra, it would have effectively
barred diversification from being considered in an adjudicatory procedure.
153. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. at 2119.
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nomic loss from divestiture. Under the rule divested owners can
sell their licenses to the highest bidder,lJ4subject to routine approval by the Commission. Had diversity been made a determinative factor in a license proceeding denying renewal, however,
deposed licensees could not have sold their licenses. Their license
equity would have been entirely lost, not as a result of a failure
to achieve a certain standard of broadcast quality, but because
the Commission decided they controlled too much media in the
same community. lJ5
A rule, regardless of whether it requires limited or across-theboard divestiture, also avoids the extensive time and delay inherent in ad hoc consideration of diversity. Some adjudication, however, may still be necessary if parties marshal sufficient evidence
to merit waiver of the general ownership restrictionlJ6since the
FCC appears unwilling to grant waiver without a hearing.lJ7

B. Allocation of the Burden of Proof
Because available data pertinent to the decision in NCCB
was inconclusive, the allocation of the "burden of proof [should]
generally determine the outcome in the tug-of-war between the
media and the 'public interest.'
The FCC's ruling, sustained
by the Supreme Court, places the burden of proof on those desiring cross-ownership only if certain policy considerations indicate
that extraordinary emphasis can be given diversity.
For example, the Commission rationally concluded that diversified ownership is more desirable when it can be achieved
without disruption.lJ9 Even though the benefits of diversity are
speculative, prohibiting the future acquisition or transfer of
newspaper-broadcast combinations in the same community is
appropriate because it presents no risk of disruption harmful to
local ownership or existing broadcast service. In light of these
other policy considerations, those desiring to acquire newspaper-

154. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1085.
155. See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.35 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
156. The waiver criteria are broad enough that media interests may often successfully
challenge the general rule. Mills, supra note 143, a t 1248-49.
157. BROADCASTING,
Aug. 4, 1975, a t 23.
158. Leuchter, supra note 83, a t 369; see W. BAER,H. GELLER& J. GRUNDFEST,
STATION
CROSS-OWNERSIP:
OPTIONS
FOR FEDERAL
ACTION30 (1974)
NEWSPAPER-TELEVISION
ACTION].
[hereinafter cited as OPTIONSFOR FEDERAL
159. Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 53
F.C.C.2d 589, 592 (1975).
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broadcast combinations in the future must shoulder the burden
of showing that a potential newspaper-broadcast combination
should be exempt from the prohibition of cross-ownership.
Similarly, diversity is a more compelling consideration in
serious cases of media monopolization. In situations where one
party owns the only broadcast station and the only daily newspaper in a community, that party must demonstrate how the monopoly serves the overall public interest. Divestiture can only be
avoided through temporary or permanent waiver if the party can
show that (1) the station or newspaper cannot be sold for its
estimated value, (2) divestiture of one of the two facilities would
force the other out of business, or (3) the public interest is better
served by allowing the combination's continued existence.lM
In situations where the concentration of ownership is not as
significant and there exists no evidence of abuse arising from
newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership, the presumption would be
in the media owners' favor, requiring the government to show
harm to the public interest in order to force divestiture? Although the FCC has the right to regulate media ownership, a
policy favoring freedom from government intervention should
control where sufficient intermedia competition exists and no
abuses are foundF2 This is consistent with past FCC multiple
ownership rules ordering divestiture, which have grandfathered
existing media combinations in the absence of abuse or potentially harmful media concentration,ld3leaving the government
with the burden of showing that a particular media concentration
harms the public interest and should be broken up.

The FCC's ruling is rational and was appropriately upheld
by the Supreme Court. The remainder of this Comment, however,
will recommend possible future modifications of the ruling based
160. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1085. The court of appeals commented favorably upon the Commission's waiver rules. 555 F.2d at 966 & n.112.
161. In W. BAER,supra note 79, perhaps the most comprehensive and unbiased of the
studies, it is noted that across-the-board regulatory prohibitions generally require substantial case evidence or enough samples with matched controls to determine that the
conduct to be prohibited is representative of the entire set of parties to be regulated. Here,
the "body of case evidence has not shown that group or cross-media owners influence their
media outlets or otherwise behave differently from other media owners." Id. a t 143. AnS
other study concluded that only a limited divestiture order is appropriate. O P ~ O NFOR
FEDERALACTION,supra note 158, a t 39-42. Contra, Leuchter, supra note 83, a t 370.
162. Mills, supra note 143, at 1240-41.
163. See notes 6, 65-71 and accompanying text supra.
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upon a finer balance between diversity of ownership and other
public interest factors. In addition, alternative means will be suggested for promoting diversity of ideas without divestiture.

A. Modifications to the FCC's Divestiture Rule
Although the Commission was correct in limiting divestiture
to the most egregious cases, more consideration should be given
to the method of determining which combinations should be divested. A study made after the FCC ruling showed that location
of the station studio had a greater impact on coverage of local
issues than broadcast contours or wave reach. In light of the
Supreme Court's recognition that local control and programming
are factors of some significance,lB4the Commission should consider the study's recommendation that newspaper-broadcast
cross-ownership be eliminated on the basis of broadcast studio
location rather than wave reach.lB5
Because UHF-TV and radio stations are generally weaker in
influence than both VHF-TV and newspapers,16"hey are less
likely to dominate a community's media market and should thus
be less subject to divestiture. This argument applies particularly
to radio because research indicates that the public looks to television and newspapers for its news and information on public affairs, while "[olther broadcast services and other printed publications are substantially less significant in this respect?" Thus
a radio or UHF station subject to divestiture under the FCC rule
should be allowed a waiver under relaxed standards since such
broadcast services do not have a significant impact on the applicable media market.IBg

I.

B. Alternative Means of Promoting Diversity of Ideas
Petitions to deny without a Sherman Act violation
The Commission appropriately grandfathered most

164. See 98 S. Ct. a t 2119.
supra note 11, a t 232-41. Thirty-nine combinations would be unaf165. W. GORMLEY,
fected if newspaper-television cross-ownerships were divested in cities served by only one
or two local stations. Id. a t 240.
166. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1063.
167. First Report and Order, supra note 6, a t 344. The Roper study showed that 59%
of the people surveyed depend on television, with newspapers a cl&e second, and other
media far behind. Id.
168. See OFTIONSFOR FEDERAL
ACTION,supra note 158, a t 38 n.1. In its order the FCC
granted two waivers without a specific request. Second Report and Order, supra note 2,
a t 1085. The Commission's discussion indicates an inclination to grant waiver if a radio
or UHF station is involved. See id..
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newspaper-broadcast combinations, but may have erred in its
refusal to consider petitions to deny these combinations a license
renewal except upon a showing of possible Sherman Act violations.lg9This leaves too onerous a burden for the Commission
itself and for other parties desiring to obtain a broadcast license.
Although divestiture should be limited in the absence of misuse
by cross-owned media, the Commission and outside parties
should be able to expose unduly restrictive news and programming policies in an adjudicatory hearing even though they do not
constitute a violation of the Sherman Act.170 The FCC has required monopolies to divest "where the circumstances present a
spectre of specific abuse . . . or the great likelihood thereof,"171
and should continue this policy by requiring hearings on petitions
to deny licensing that present substantial evidence of abuse, even
though an antitrust violation does not exist. Because antitrust
actions are lengthy and only marginally effective in combating
harmful concentration, such a rule could accelerate elimination
of media misuse. If more than a mere allegation of monopolistic
misuse is shown, the cross-owner should be subject to the burden
imposed by an adjudicatory hearing on the matter.
2. Rules requiring operational separation

In establishing media ownership policy, the ultimate goal is
a marketplace containing a substantial number of differing ideas.
A broad selection of ideas would more assuredly exist through
rules requiring the operational separation of commonly owned
newspaper-broadcast combinations, rather than through divestiture rules that only indirectly affect message pluralism and a t the
same time reduce local ownership and interrupt public service.
Although the Commission commended conscientious joint owners
for their efforts to assure operational separation, it did not require
grandfathered combinations to be operationally separate."' One
169. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits "monopolization" if a "censurable act"
created or maintained the monopoly. It would be difficult to argue that the filing of an
original license or a license renewal constitutes a censurable act, especially when the
license or renewal has been granted by a government agency. S. Barnett, Cross-Ownership
of Mass Media in the Same City: A Report to the John and Mary R. Markle Foundation,
A Critique of, and Supplement to, the Prospective Reports of the Rand Corporation 4
(Sept. 23, 1974).
170. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, at 1110 (Hooks, Commissioner, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
171. Id. See, e.g., Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 17 F.C.C.2d 245, modified, 18 F.C.C.2d 120 (1969).
172. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t 1089. However, Commissioners
Quello and Hooks urge the policy's adoption. Id. at 1112 (concurring statements).
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party urged the FCC to adopt a rule mandating that commonly
owned newspapers and broadcast stations maintain separate advertising sales staffs, separate editorial and reportorial personnel,
and fair program listings for all television stations, while avoiding
combination rates and discriminatory advertising rates for advertisers who use competitive media.ln Such a rule should be promulgated by either the FCC or Congress174with the additional
stipulation that news staffs conduct entirely independent research and make no special arrangements to share completed
stories. 175
Allegations that a broadcast licensee is violating these rules
may best be made in petitions to deny license grants or renewals.
The Commission should be able to challenge a cross-owner's license at any time if substantial evidence exists showing practices
that may be violative of these proposed standards. This policy
could negate any adverse consequences of cross-ownership and
forestall government intervention through across-the-board divestiture without being construed as a restriction on speech or
~ 0 n t e n t . Furthermore,
l~~
the rules would not create the unnecessary disruption, reduced local ownership, and economic dislocation that would likely result if strict divestiture were mandated.
Licensees could anticipate the bases for potential challenges to
license renewal, and would naturally strive to meet well-defined
minimum standards.177Should cross-owners violate these rules,
they could then be expected to shoulder the burden of defending
against a petition to deny licensing.
3. Other means

Diversity of ideas can be encouraged without denigration of
other public interest concerns through various means not already
discussed. FCC regulations are appropriate when needed to prevent harm to a substantial public or governmental interest, but
the restriction should be no greater than required to protect that
173. Id. at 1112 (quoting proposal of Marcus Cohn embodied in letter from Marcus
Cohn to the Broadcast Bureau (July 26, 1974)).
174. The Commission is presently considering regulations treating combination rat.es
and joint sales practice. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, at 1089 n.49.
175. Cf. note 106 supra (news story overlap among cross-owned facilities in part
caused by sharing of employees and news stories).
176. The rules would only assure a certain method of conduct without rest.rict.ing
content in violation of the first amendment.
177. See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.35 (D. C.
Cir. 1971).
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interest.178Congress could further subsidize development of UHF
or institute rules encouraging techand cable television systems179
nological advances in other ways.laOBroadcasters, as public trustees, could be required to lease air time, just as cable television
operators must provide an "access" channel. 181 Increased enforcement of the fairness doctrine and equal time provisions could
promote diversity of ideas without requiring the separation of colocated newspaper-broadcast combinations.

VI. CONCLUSION
Congress created the FCC to regulate broadcast media in
order to promote the best practicable service to the community
with due regard to media owners' first amendment rights. The
courts, consequently, may not intervene unless the administrative decision is arbitrary. In elaborating on the Supreme Court's
decision in NCCB, this Comment shows that the FCC and the
courts have never accorded diversity of ownership controlling
weight in broadcast licensing procedures, and media ownership
rules have only required divestiture upon a showing of monopolistic abuse or serious concentration of ownership. Furthermore,
because the broadcast spectrum can be expanded through technology and since the total number of newspaper-broadcast combinations is naturally decreasing, total divestiture seems a harsh
remedy, especially if divestiture is only marginally effective in
promoting the ultimate goal, diversity of ideas. Rules promoting
diversity of control through divestiture should also be limited in
consideration of their potential adverse effects on local ownership, continuity and stability of public service, and private economic viability. In consideration of these policies and the precedent against granting diversity controlling weight, the Commission's limited divestiture order was rationally supported, and
hence correctly sustained by the Supreme Court. The best regulatory approach to common ownership of newspaper and broadcast
media in the same community is a rule that requires separation
178. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 47-48 (1977).
179. OPTIONS
FOR FEDERAL
ACTIONS,
supra note 158, at 30 n.1. The "creation of additional types and methods of broadcasting is our best hope for more representative programming-publicly supported broadcasting, community antenna (CATV), and perhaps
subscription TV." Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HAW.
L. REV.1693, 1700 (1969).
180. Cf. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 676 (1972) (Burger, C.
J . , concurring) (arguing that the advent of cable television calls for a congressional reexamination of the Communications Act).
181. OPTIONS
FOR FEDERAL
ACTION,
supra note 158, at 30 & n.1.
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of only those combinations that represent serious local monopolies or clearly misuse their media concentration posture. Because
of divestiture's detrimental impact, operational separation, technological advances, and other alternatives should be encouraged
as more direct means of promulgating a marketplace of diverse
ideas.

Richard W. Sheffield

